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ONLINE CONTENT POLICY: WHAT LEGISLATIVE
PROPOSALS AIMING TO REIN IN “BIG TECH” NEED TO
GRAPPLE WITH
SHOSHANA WEISSMANN
INTRODUCTION
There are endless proposals in Congress aimed at fixing the problems
with “Big Tech.” Introduced over the last four years, each one hopes to
solve problems such as the spread of misinformation online, the spread of
unlawful content online, or even the removal of constitutionally protected
speech from internet platforms.1
Unfortunately, these various pieces of legislation that hope to regulate
social media regularly fail to grapple with all kinds of problems, such as
First Amendment barriers to action. Further, they fail to recognize that
social media is not the cause of many of the problems that legislators seek
to solve. This Essay will outline a handful of the biggest issues that elude
lawmakers proposing changes to § 230 of the Communications Decency
Act of 19962 and content moderation policy.
Most importantly, these legislative proposals often raise First
Amendment concerns and confuse what the First Amendment does
compared with what § 230 does. In many cases, policymakers seem to
think that removing § 230’s liability shield for platforms will halt
offending behavior or that platforms will be forced to act on offending
behavior. However, much of the targeted content is constitutionally
protected. That means that the government cannot compel platforms to
treat this speech differently, and, if brought before a court, neither the
speaker nor the platform would be punished. In short, removing the
1. See generally Health Misinformation Act of 2021, S. 2448, 117th Cong. (2021);
Preserving Political Speech Online Act, S. 2338, 117th Cong. § 4 (2021); Promoting Rights and
Online Speech Protections to Ensure Every Consumer Heard (PRO-SPEECH) Act, S. 2448,
117th Cong. § 2 (2021); Don’t Push My Buttons Act, H.R. 8515, 117th Cong. § 2 (2021).
2. Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. §§ 230, 560–61.
35
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liability shield from § 230 would waste court time and increase legal fees
unnecessarily.
Furthermore, many regulations aim to curb misinformation but fail to
account for the government’s own proclivities for spreading the exact
same kind of misinformation. Giving the government power to prevent
constitutionally protected—if undesirable—speech while the government
itself is also producing some of this speech seems counterproductive, if
not ridiculous.
Other proposals would expose platforms that do not remove certain
kinds of unlawful speech to liability, even though the actual speakers who
produce unlawful speech already receive due process if and when they are
sued. Judges and courts determine the legality of such speech. Platforms
are ill-equipped to handle the task even at a small scale, let alone
thousands of times daily and often without the necessary legal expertise
and context. Forcing moderators to be constant and quick “judges and
juries” is impossible and leaves platforms liable for all the illegal content
they miss—even if it is just several pieces out of the millions that they do
catch.
Finally, regulators need to grapple with the fact that many changes to
§ 230 are functionally repeals of § 230. The purpose of § 230 is in no
small part to prevent platforms from continuously being dragged into
court to defend user speech that they had no hand in creating. Reopening
the legal floodgates in small or large ways recreates the original problem
that § 230 was designed to solve. The previous legal environment
punished platforms that attempted to keep users safe or maintain familyfriendly environments, while ultimately rewarding platforms that took a
fully hands-off approach to moderation.
I. YOUR PROBLEM IS NOT WITH § 230—IT IS WITH THE FIRST
AMENDMENT
All too often regulators fail to recognize which problems are caused
by § 230 and which are caused by the free speech protected by the First
Amendment. When a law targets speech protected by the First
Amendment, it not only misdiagnoses the problem, but also faces a high
bar for constitutional scrutiny. This is the case whether a law targets
undesirable but legal speech, algorithms and the users who benefit from
them, or content moderation standards.
In the online world, the First Amendment allows for content
moderation regardless of whether a platform keeps up undesirable content
or removes content a user enjoys. It is also the law that enables Twitter to
append fact checks to former President Donald J. Trump’s tweets and that
allows people to be mean to one another online. Section 230 also allows
for biased moderation—since “unbiased moderation” does not exist—and
allows platforms to moderate as they see fit. All moderators have normal
human biases, and humans that use artificial intelligence for moderation
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put their own biases into that artificial intelligence—whether or not they
are aware that they are doing so.
Even without § 230, platforms could continue this content
moderation policy. What differentiates § 230 from the First Amendment
in its infamous (c)(1) provision is the stipulation that “no provider or user
of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or
speaker of any information provided by another information content
provider.”3 Section 230(c)(2) further provides that:
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held
liable on account of–
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or
availability of material that the provider or user considers to be
obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or
otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is
constitutionally protected . . . .4

Simply put, § 230 prevents platforms and users from being treated as
speakers of content that they did not author. If I tweet, I am liable for the
tweet and Twitter is not liable. If Twitter, the company itself, posts a
comment on your mother’s blog, Twitter remains liable and your mother
cannot be sued for such content. If Facebook appends a fact check to a
user’s post on its website, it is only liable for the appended fact check and
not for the original Facebook post. If someone retweets a piece of content,
they are not liable for sharing that piece of content; only the person who
created the tweet is liable. Additionally, platforms are shielded from
liability when moderating as they see fit. There is plenty of legal but
undesirable content that platforms may want to remove, reduce access to,
or otherwise restrict—and they have a right to do so.
With this information in mind, one can understand why various laws
attempting to alter § 230 falter when they target speech protected by the
First Amendment.
Consider the Health Misinformation Act of 2021,5 which requires the
Secretary of Health and Human Services to work with the leaders of “other
relevant Federal agencies and outside experts” to determine what
constitutes health misinformation.6 The proposal would amend § 230 by
having platforms treated as speakers of user-created content that contains
such “health misinformation” if an algorithm of an online platform
promotes the misinformation.7 Algorithms are exempt from this law if
their promotion “occurs through a neutral mechanism, such as through the
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
Id. § 230(c)(2).
Health Misinformation Act of 2021, S. 2448, 117th Cong. (2021).
Id. § 3(b).
See id. § 3(a)(1)(B).
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use of chronological functionality.”8 The law also only applies to
“covered periods,” defined as a “period during which a public health
emergency declared by the Secretary of Health and Human Services under
section 319 of the Public Health Service Act” is in effect.9
The First Amendment problems with such a law are manifest.
“Health misinformation” is no less First Amendment protected speech
than any other lie or incorrect speech. Furthermore, “neutral mechanisms”
is a vaguely defined standard by which to judge algorithms. It is unclear
whether an algorithm that promotes similar content to the type of content
people already enjoy would be considered “neutral,” or if an algorithm
that promotes content to users based on location would be considered
neutral, because the legislation does not clearly define the term.
Furthermore, as Mike Masnick of Techdirt explains, “‘the algorithm’ is
simply a set of recommendations, and recommendations are opinions and
opinions are . . . protected expression under the 1st Amendment.”10 While
the law would not directly prevent platforms from recommending health
misinformation—whatever that term ends up meaning—the practical
effects of applying cost and risk to such speech activity are nevertheless
sure to alter how platforms moderate.
As a study from Daphne Keller at the Cyber Policy Center at Stanford
University notes, “[w]hen required to interpret more nuanced legal rules
under threat of liability, platforms’ performance is also poor. They tend,
predictably, to protect themselves by erring on the side of overenforcement.”11 To explain succinctly why incentives to over-enforce can
bring with them First Amendment violations, the study points to an
excerpt from a ruling by the Eighth Circuit, Midwest Video v. FCC,12 in
which a Federal Communications Commission regulation required “cable
operators to restrict unlawful content from programmers.”13 The court
explained that
[i]n so mandating, the Commission appears to have created a corps of
involuntary government surrogates, but without providing the
procedural safeguards respecting “prior restraint” required of the
8. Id.
9. Id. § 3(a)(2).
10. Mike Masnick, House Democrats Decide to Hand Facebook the Internet by
Unconstitutionally Taking § 230 Away from Algorithms, TECHDIRT (Oct. 14, 2021, 10:57 AM),
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20211014/10420547749/house-democrats-decide-to-handfacebook-internet-unconstitutionally-taking-section-230-away-algorithms.shtml
[https://perma.cc/3E8A-NN2X].
11. Daphne Keller, Amplification and Its Discontents, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST.
(June
8,
2021),
https://knightcolumbia.org/content/amplification-and-its-discontents
[https://perma.cc/GA4P-AX8C].
12. Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir. 1978), aff’d, 440 U.S. 689
(1979).
13. See Keller, supra note 11.
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government. . . . Thus the Commission made the cable operator both
judge and jury, and subjected the cable user’s First Amendment rights
to decision by an unqualified private citizen, whose personal interest
in satisfying the Commission enlists him on the “safe” side—the side
of suppression.14

The concern regarding making an operator “both judge and jury” will
also be relevant later in this Essay, because determining what content is
and is not illegal is an extraordinarily difficult task for platforms and an
important reason why § 230 exists in the first place. It is unreasonable to
suggest “judge and jury” tasks can be adequately adjudicated by
moderators who often lack legal training or context to even make such
determinations, let alone without error.
The Health Misinformation Act of 2021 is far from the only federal
proposal that attempts to regulate algorithms but fails to overcome the
high hurdle of First Amendment protection. Although algorithms are also
pieces of expression protected by our freedom of expression, there is
another consideration: First Amendment rights of users.
While the Health Misinformation Act regulates the amplification of
content, “[a] law telling platforms to demote or promote particular kinds
of content, or holding them liable for failure to do so, would be a law
regulating platform users’ speech,” as the study explains.15 Keller points
to United States v. Playboy16 as one of many examples of the Supreme
Court making this fact clear. The case was centered around a law
mandating that cable providers restrict access to pornographic content
provided by certain channels.17 The majority opinion of the case
explained that “[t]he distinction between laws burdening and laws
banning speech is but a matter of degree. The government’s content-based
burdens must satisfy the same rigorous scrutiny as its content-based
bans.”18
The principle applied by the Court in Playboy assists with
conceptualizing the problem with regulating algorithms. At first glance,
the idea of altering an algorithm might not seem to burden First
Amendment rights of users. Some user content will be shown instead of
other content. Nonetheless, user content will still be shown. However,
when considering that the government is the one altering which user
content will be shown—burdening some content or unburdening other
content according to its desire—the reason such restrictions have to pass
First Amendment scrutiny is more obvious. Even if that restriction is on
illegal content—rather than undesirable or otherwise bad content such as
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Midwest Video Corp., 571 F.2d at 1056–57.
See Keller, supra note 11.
United States v. Playboy Ent. Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000).
Id. at 837–39.
Id. at 812.

11A. WEISSMANN_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

40

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

5/18/22 4:37 PM

[Vol. 44:35

health misinformation—the content that the government seeks to restrict
access to cannot be restricted by whim, but only by due process for users,
which they have not received.
Furthermore, as Keller explains, the law was challenged by the
programmers, not by cable companies, due to infringement of
programmers’ rights, in the same way regulations of algorithms may
burden the rights of users rather than platforms.19 This is not to say that
cable companies or platforms do not have free speech rights—they do—
but it is possible that the stronger cases do not deal with the
intermediaries.20
Content moderation is similarly protected speech. Proposals such as
the Preserving Political Speech Online Act would violate the First
Amendment by amending § 230 to require political neutrality in content
moderation by some platforms if they are to maintain their § 230
protection from lawsuits for content that they did not author.21 But one
must remember that § 230 is not the provision that enables content
moderation, even if it does ease the process by removing unnecessary and
ineffective liability. The law that enables moderation is the First
Amendment.
Multiple courts have found that content moderation is a form of
speech and as such it is protected by the First Amendment.22 Content
moderation is an act of expression and, like other acts of expression,
protected by our freedom of speech.23
Legislation proposing to reform § 230 and other legislation like it
would discriminate against content moderation on a basis not allowed by
the First Amendment in order to expose platforms to liability for user
content. Such legislation misunderstands § 230 as the law protecting
treatment of content moderation, rather than understanding that the First
Amendment is that law.
II. THE GOVERNMENT CAN GET THINGS WRONG
Aside from the First Amendment problems with the Health
Misinformation Act of 2021, one must note that the Act touches on
content coming from the highest levels of government itself.24 Indeed, a
19. See Keller, supra note 11.
20. See id.
21. See Preserving Political Speech Online Act, S. 2338, 117th Cong. § 4 (2021).
22. See Berin Szóka & Ari Cohn, The Wall Street Journal Misreads § 230 and the First
Amendment, LAWFARE (Feb. 3, 2021, 3:43 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/wall-streetjournal-misreads-section-230-and-first-amendment [https://perma.cc/2R44-VMA3].
23. See John Samples, Why the Government Should Not Regulate Content Moderation
of Social Media, CATO INST. (Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/whygovernment-should-not-regulate-content-moderation-social-media
[https://perma.cc/K4ZB8TUN].
24. See Health Misinformation Act of 2021, S. 2448, 117th Cong. § 3 (2021).
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study from Cornell University found that President Donald J. Trump was
the single largest driver of misinformation regarding COVID-19.25 Even
the bill’s sponsor, Senator Amy Klobuchar, has been a frequent critic of
President Trump’s COVID-19 response and has suggested she did not
think he was taking the pandemic seriously enough.26 This legislation
fails to grapple with the real source of the misinformation and hands the
power to combat what it defines as misinformation to the source spreading
so much of it. President Trump does not currently hold the office of the
presidency. But he may again one day, as may another president who
expresses similar views that Senator Klobuchar considered to be
spreading health misinformation. If enacted and somehow held
constitutional, legislation like the Health Misinformation Act would give
that future officeholder the power to coerce social media sites to suppress
valid health information.
Another problem is that health information is constantly evolving.
Even Dr. Anthony Fauci, the director of the National Institute of Allergy
and Infectious Diseases, and also a member of the White House
Coronavirus Task Force, initially recommended against people wearing
masks in order to protect themselves from COVID-19.27 Fauci’s rationale
for doing so included concern that healthcare workers would face a
shortage of protective equipment if people were encouraged to wear
masks and also a lack of awareness of the high amount of asymptomatic
cases of COVID-19.28 In any case, under this legislation, the Health and
Human Services Secretary could have decided that directing people to
wear masks in order to protect themselves was “health misinformation”
and then the law would have required penalizing platforms whose
algorithms promoted this information.
In the same way that Fauci’s decision regarding masks changed, the
government regularly changes its decisions on health information.
Possibly most notoriously, the U.S. Department of Agriculture has issued
factually incorrect “food pyramids” for years.29 Skim milk, for example,
25. Tommy Beer, Trump Is ‘Single Largest Driver’ of Covid-19 Misinformation, Cornell
Study
(Oct.
1,
2020,
3:23
PM),
Finds,
FORBES
https://www.forbes.com/sites/tommybeer/2020/10/01/trump-is-single-largest-driver-of-covid19-misinformation-cornell-study-finds/ [https://perma.cc/A82U-EELK].
26. See Amy Klobuchar (@AmyKlobuchar), TWITTER (Aug. 12, 2020, 8:58 AM),
https://twitter.com/amyklobuchar/status/1293713398803439622
[https://perma.cc/B5PH4G9T]; Amy Klobuchar (@AmyKlobuchar), TWITTER (Sept. 13, 2020, 9:45 PM),
https://twitter.com/amyklobuchar/status/1305321676251561984
[https://perma.cc/5D37RQHE].
27. See Did Fauci Say Not to Wear Masks?, CNN: FACTS FIRST,
https://www.cnn.com/factsfirst/politics/factcheck_e58c20c6-8735-4022-a1f5-1580bc732c45
[https://perma.cc/FQ7A-NJPQ].
28. Id.
29. See Meir J. Stampfer & Walter C. Willett, Rebuilding the Food Pyramid, SCI. AM.
(Dec. 1, 2006), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/rebuilding-the-food-pyramid
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has had a sordid history during which researchers were unsure if it was
better than whole milk, although that did not seem to pause the
government’s certainty.30 These examples are not far-fetched or based in
some hypothetical—they come from recent history. Concerns regarding
misinformation are very real when lawmakers and executive officials are
regularly promoting misinformation—including during congressional
hearings about misinformation—and when the government itself is wrong
about health information.31
III. “LAWFUL” CONTENT IS NOT CLEAR-CUT
Another common kind of proposal demands that social media
companies must not take down any content that is not illegal. Aside from
First Amendment problems that have already been explored, there is also
the problem that platforms are in no position to determine the legality or
lack thereof of even a few pieces of content, let alone millions. Cases of
libel regularly go through our court systems and before judges and juries.
These cases are intensive, require abundant evidence, and require rulings
of law that social media platforms are in no position to provide millions
of times annually, if not monthly.
Take for example the PRO-SPEECH Act, which, among other
provisions, forbids platforms from taking any action that “[b]locks or
otherwise prevents a user or entity from accessing any lawful content,
application, service, or device that does not interfere with the internet
platform’s functionality or pose a data privacy or data security risk to a
user.”32 The law only applies to the very largest social media platforms
but provides that the Federal Trade Commission may apply the law to
smaller platforms as it sees fit.33
Open a transparency report published by any online platform, and one
will see explanations of why categories of millions of pieces of content
have been removed from the platform. In the second quarter of 2021,
Facebook reported removing more than twenty-five million pieces of
identified child exploitation material.34 Surely within those millions, at
[https://perma.cc/M6ME-T7K9].
30. See Emma Green, The Controversial Life of Skim Milk, ATL. (Nov. 20, 2013),
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2013/11/the-controversial-life-of-skimmilk/281655 [https://perma.cc/B2E8-BJGJ].
31. See Shoshana Weissmann & Canyon Brimhall, The Misinformation Congress
Peddled at a Hearing to Combat Misinformation with Technology CEOs, R ST. (Apr. 12, 2021),
https://www.rstreet.org/2021/04/12/the-misinformation-congress-peddled-at-a-hearing-tocombat-misinformation-with-technology-ceos/ [https://perma.cc/BH53-E2LH].
32. Promoting Rights and Online Speech Protections to Ensure Every Consumer Heard
(PRO-SPEECH) Act, S. 2448, 117th Cong. § 2 (2021).
33. See id.
34. Child Endangerment: Nudity and Physical Abuse and Sexual Exploitation, META
TRANSPARENCY
CTR.,
https://transparency.fb.com/data/community-standards-
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least one or two pieces were removed accidentally or erroneously and
contained innocent images. Facebook would be penalized under the PROSPEECH Act in those few cases. Also consider Facebook’s removal of
tens of millions of pieces of pro-terrorism content each year.35 Its net is
broad. “We do not allow organizations or individuals that proclaim a
violent mission, or are engaging in violence, to have a presence on
Facebook and Instagram,” reads Facebook’s policy, adding, “[w]e do not
allow content that praises, supports or represents individuals or groups
engaging in terrorist activity or organized hate.”36 Much of this speech is
completely legal and protected by the First Amendment.37 Indeed, the
Brandenburg v. Ohio38 standard requires that, to be in violation of the law,
the speech in question must be “directed to inciting or producing
imminent, lawless action and . . . likely to incite or produce such action.”39
And much hate speech does not rise to the standard. “Hate speech” is not
a legal term and includes “any form of expression through which speakers
intend to vilify, humiliate, or incite hatred against a group or a class of
persons on the basis of race, religion, skin color[,] sexual identity, gender
identity, ethnicity, disability, or national origin.”40 Much of that which is
described will not, in practice, rise to the Brandenburg standard. Yes,
posts that promote terrorism are awful and at the very least undesirable,
but they are also often legal. And that means under the PRO-SPEECH
Act, Facebook could be punished for restricting access to content posted
in support of terrorist organizations.
As Keller’s study explains, evidence demonstrates that platforms are
not well equipped to determine what content violates the law and they tend
to err on the side of overenforcement.41 In a situation where the PROSPEECH Act is law, however, they would be penalized for such errors.
We are even thinking far too far ahead when considering that speech
by terrorists is often protected by the First Amendment. Keller points to
a Human Rights Watch report explaining how “[a]lgorithms designed to
find terrorist material, for example, can’t tell the difference between ISIS

enforcement/child-nudity-and-sexual-exploitation/facebook [https://perma.cc/F6UZ-XHQ6].
35. See Dangerous Organizations: Terrorism and Organized Hate, META
TRANSPARENCY
CTR.,
https://transparency.fb.com/data/community-standardsenforcement/dangerous-organizations/facebook [https://perma.cc/X44C-4JT].
36. Id.
37. Jaclyn K. Haughom, Combatting Terrorism in a Digital Age: First Amendment
Implications, FREEDOM F. INST., (Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/firstamendment-center/topics/freedom-of-speech-2/internet-first-amendment/combattingterrorism-in-a-digital-age-first-amendment-implications [https://perma.cc/C3KY-X434].
38. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
39. Id. at 447.
40. See Hate Speech and Hate Crime, ALA AM. LIBR. ASS’N,
https://www.ala.org/advocacy/intfreedom/hate [https://perma.cc/QUV4-5X56].
41. See Keller, supra note 11.
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propaganda and news reporting. Algorithmic failures have been blamed
for serious mistakes, including YouTube’s deletion of videos
documenting war crimes in Syria.”42
Furthermore, that algorithms—which are necessary in order to handle
large platforms’ content moderation policies—are quite so inept at these
tasks necessitates allowing room for error if we are to keep platforms
useful by any stretch of the imagination for users. Politicians advocating
for proposals like PRO-SPEECH must grapple with the very real
consequences of the policy changes that they are suggesting.
IV. PLATFORMS OF DIFFERENT SIZES AND DIFFERENT PURPOSES
NEED THE ABILITY TO MODERATE DIFFERENTLY
When politicians consider proposals that impact social media, they
forget that a variety of smaller platforms will also be impacted. For
example, AllTrails is a website and app that allows people to explore trails
for all kinds of outdoor activities, from hiking to off-roading.43 It boasts
over twenty-five million users and over one million paid users, myself
included.44 On a general trail page, one will find a map, pictures, user
reviews, a user-edited trail description, weather outlook report, and more.
Some of the content is generated by AllTrails itself, but much is generated
by users. The comments and reviews discuss how the trail was for the
hiker or cycler, what to expect on the trail, how well it was or was not
maintained, what wildlife one may expect to see, and whether one needs
tickets in order to enter the trail.
Most proposals to change the way in which social media is regulated
do not consider AllTrails or even Etsy, ZocDoc, or other much smaller
platforms that would be affected. One such piece of legislation is the
Don’t Push My Buttons Act,45 which is yet another piece of legislation
that targets algorithms. The bill proposes to deny platforms § 230
protection if they collect data about users and use that data to inform the
algorithms that then deliver content to that user that they would like unless
the user opts into such a mechanism.46 In the most basic terms, this means
if a platform collects data that shows a user is interested in news about
Nicolas Cage, and that data informs algorithms that deliver content to that
user about Cage, then the platform loses § 230 protection unless the user
has opted into such algorithms. However, automatically showing users

42. Id.
43. See About Us, ALLTRAILS, https://www.alltrails.com/about [https://perma.cc/Y7PJRQP7].
44. AllTrails, AllTrails Celebrates 1 Million Paid Subscribers, CISION (Jan. 26, 2021,
8:12 AM), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/alltrails-celebrates-1-million-paidsubscribers-301214556.html [https://perma.cc/24AT-3KWN].
45. Don’t Push My Buttons Act, H.R. 8515, 117th Cong. (2020).
46. Id. § 2.
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content that they are likely to find useful is no more cause for liability for
user-generated content than manually showing users such content or not
showing users such content. In none of these cases are platforms better
able to determine what content is illegal and what content is not.
The real-world consequences here are manifest. AllTrails may use
algorithms to show users trails more relevant to hikers or cyclists, long or
short trails, trails in cold or warm places, etc. depending on previous
preferences. If it does so, it would be liable for every potential piece of
illegal content on their platform. If someone posted a scam to sell people
fake bus tickets to the Zion National Park shuttle, AllTrails would be liable
simply because it opted to show users the most relevant content.
Also consider Tripadvisor. Bloomberg reported that “[a]lmost one in
[twenty] user posts offered [on Tripadvisor] in 2018 were rejected for such
problems as being irrelevant, biased or fake.”47 Users of Tripadvisor are
shown relevant content through algorithms. If someone books a trip to
Costa Rica to see sloths, while browsing that person may see more
relevant content after the algorithm identifies the vacation goal of seeing
sloths in the wild. But under the Don’t Push My Buttons Act, showing
users more relevant content related to their travel plans would mean that
the company could not benefit from § 230’s protections due to the
legislation’s provision that excludes platforms from receiving § 230’s
protection if they use algorithms to target tailored content without explicit
consent from the user. This means that all the reviews on the Tripadvisor
pages of hotels, excursions, and more would become useless. This is due
to a principle called the “heckler’s veto.”48 Simply, any business with a
bad review could sue Tripadvisor for libel in order to remove a truthful,
but bad, review if Tripadvisor is no longer protected by § 230. Even if the
claim would be tossed out, it still goes to court and wastes legal resources
from Tripadvisor. Knowing that, the website is likely to remove any
negative reviews in order to avoid burdensome lawsuits. With an
abundance of such lawsuits on the horizon, the company may remove bad
reviews with a simple request. Consequently, consumers may be
scammed by companies who sued to remove truthful content they
disliked. Tripadvisor said as much with regard to the prospect of an
altered § 230: “Review sites such as Tripadvisor could easily become
nothing more than only-positive advertising glimpses” because “hosting
critical or negative views would create a substantial risk of legal liability,”
47. Todd Shields & Ben Brody, Facebook Worries Smaller Rivals with Openness on
Liability,
BLOOMBERG
(Dec.
23,
2020,
2:00
AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-12-23/facebook-support-for-liability-reformhas-little-guys-nervous [https://perma.cc/WFX8-YYQ3].
48. A heckler’s veto occurs where the government curtails a speaker’s right due to the
anticipated or actual response the speech elicits from opposing individuals. See Patrick
Schmidt, Heckler’s Veto, THE FIRST AMEND. ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://www.mtsu.edu/firstamendment/article/968/heckler-s-veto [https://perma.cc/UCP7-X3XP].
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reported Bloomberg, citing a Tripadvisor filing.49
Similarly, ZocDoc is a platform for people to locate and book visits
with a doctor or medical specialist.50 Each profile page provides
background information about the medical professional, reviews posted
by users, and often a simple way to book the doctor. A platform such as
this would be forbidden from showing users more relevant information
using an algorithm unless it wanted doctors to sue it to take down negative
reviews. Many doctors have specialties in specific kinds of diseases. If
ZocDoc realizes someone is seeking an endocrinologist with a specialty
in, say, Polycystic Ovary Syndrome, ZocDoc would expose itself to
massive liability were it to use algorithms that position those specialists
higher up in search results.
Generally, opening platforms to greater liability for any reason is
going to hit smaller platforms hardest. The largest platforms may have
swaths of lawyers and may be better able to handle crushing liability, but
companies like ZocDoc and Tripadvisor are markedly smaller than
Facebook or Google. For people concerned about issues of competition,
saddling smaller platforms with crushing liability that could force them to
close or seek to be acquired by a company more apt to handle it is not the
wisest decision.
V. REFORMING § 230 IS REPEALING § 230
To understand why conversations about reforming § 230 often
functionally attempt to repeal § 230, one must understand the original
lawsuit that led to the creation of § 230. The lawsuit consisted of Jordan
Belfort—commonly known as the “Wolf of Wall Street”—successfully
suing a platform for a user posting libel, even though that user was
ultimately vindicated.51
The authors of § 230 themselves tell the story of how the law came
to be in USA Today. Jordan Belfort founded the notorious stock brokerage
Stratton Oakmont, which “was eventually exposed as a massive fraud.
When the firm was shut down by authorities, he went to prison,” remind
Senator Ron Wyden and Representative Chris Cox—who crafted § 230.52
And during the fraud’s tenure, whistleblowers tried to alert people through
various means, including one whistleblower who posted on an older

49. Shields & Brody, supra note 47.
50. See
Picture
a
Patient,
ZOCDOC,
https://www.zocdoc.com/about/
[https://perma.cc/3XNY-7VNK].
51. See generally Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL
805178 (N.Y. Dec. 11, 1995).
52. Ron Wyden & Chris Cox, Don’t Let Donald Trump Crush Internet Free Speech,
USA
TODAY
(Dec.
18,
2020,
4:00
AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2020/12/18/section-230-and-complications-freespeech-internet-column/3928033001 [https://perma.cc/LJ5U-SRED].
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platform called “Prodigy.”53 He called the brokerage a “cult of brokers
who either lie for a living or get fired.”54 Belfort and Oakmont sued
Prodigy for libel, seeking hundreds of millions in damages.55
Prodigy played no role beyond being the forum where the
whistleblower posted those words, and therefore argued it should not be
responsible.56 It could not ascertain the validity of the statement posted
and never added to the statement posted.57 Unfortunately, a court held in
favor of Belfort essentially because Prodigy moderated and attempted to
keep its platform family-friendly, and this single comment on its platform
did not meet that standard.58 Had it not attempted to moderate or protect
users, the court would have held otherwise.59 “The alarming message of
this case was clear: in the future, online platforms shouldn’t attempt to
moderate even the most awful content,” Wyden and Cox wrote.60 “Doing
so would make them legally responsible for everything their users post.”61
This perverse scenario is known as the “moderator’s dilemma,” in
which interactive services either moderate at all and risk liability or
moderate nothing and avoid liability for user content.62 That means
allowing scams, spam, swearing (whether or not the platform is best suited
for that kind of content), harassment, hate speech, and other undesirable
content. It also means allowing people to post the same thing 100 times
in a row and inundate inboxes with unwanted messages, racist content,
and more. For example, AllTrails would have to keep up completely
irrelevant religious or political content.
On the other side of the dilemma, platforms could opt to moderate,
keep users safe, and be sued for user content.63 Twitter could be sued for
one piece of libel out of billions on its platform, even if it was fully
unaware that the content existed, let alone unable to determine its legality.
It is a perfect scenario to recreate the circumstances that let the Wolf of
Wall Street sue Prodigy and allow anyone to sue platforms for negative
content posted about them. Indeed, platforms could choose to moderate
and risk being sued left and right. Smaller platforms would likely not
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See Bobby Allyn, As Trump Targets Twitter’s Legal Shield, Experts Have a Warning,
NPR (May 30, 2020, 11:36 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/05/30/865813960/as-trumptargets-twitters-legal-shield-experts-have-a-warning
[https://perma.cc/9QJ8-FMK8]
(explaining the “moderator’s dilemma” and § 230’s impact on the quandary).
63. See id.
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choose this path as they cannot afford that massive risk. Larger platforms
like Facebook may be able to weather it to a degree, due in part to their
large teams of lawyers.
Reinstating the conditions of the “moderator’s dilemma” would also
likely make circumstances harder for smaller platforms without the ability
to choose to moderate, and it would entrench larger platforms with more
options. A recently introduced piece of legislation would repeal § 230 and
reintroduce the dilemma in full.64
Many suggest small alterations of § 230 would evade creating this
dilemma. But this simply is not true. Altering § 230 is less akin to
removing some M&Ms from a large bowl than it is to cutting open an
avocado that will proceed to rot. One attorney succinctly explains the
reason why reform is often repeal: “if you have to litigate whether § 230
applies to you, you might as well not have it on the books in the first
place.”65 If exemptions to § 230 mean a platform must go to court to prove
that the law protects them from lawsuits, the law no longer serves its
purpose. The heckler vetoes.
Furthermore, the attorney notes that “the crippling expense of having
to assert one’s First Amendment rights in court, and potentially at an
unimaginable scale given all the user-generated content Internet platforms
facilitate, means that this First Amendment protection is functionally
illusory if there’s not a mechanism to get platforms out of litigation early
and cheaply.”66
One example of a small alteration to § 230 that would essentially
nullify its effects is exempting § 230 protections for certain kinds of
content. First, earmarking specific content for liability would not solve
the issue of accurately finding and mitigating that content on huge
platforms. Consider the proposal to carve out terrorism content from
§ 230.67 As previously explored, social media platforms struggle to
identify this content well despite being endlessly involved in removing
that content. Between April and June of 2021 alone, YouTube removed
431,355 videos of extremism or terrorist content, but there are likely many
more that may have been missed.68 But it would be liable for what it
64.
65.

See S. 2972, 117th Cong. § 1 (2021).
Cathy Gellis, Why § 230 ‘Reform’ Effectively Means § 230 Repeal, TECHDIRT (Oct.
12,
2021,
10:55
AM)
(emphasis
omitted),
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20211004/11400447697/why-section-230-reformeffectively-means-section-230-repeal.shtml [https://perma.cc/A3Q2-WGGV].
66. Id.
67. See generally Bill to Amend Section 230 of the Communications Act of 1934, 117th
Cong., 1st Sess. (2021) (discussion draft), https://republicans-energycommerce.house.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2021/07/19-Palmer-Sec-230-Terrorism-Content.pdf [https://perma.cc/5U7ANX83].
68. Featured
Policies,
GOOGLE
TRANSPARENCY
REP.,
https://transparencyreport.google.com/youtube-policy/featured-policies/violent-extremism
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misses. In the case of a recent change known as “FOSTA-SESTA,”
opponents warned of a host of unintended consequences, and they were
ultimately vindicated by a U.S. Government Accountability Office report
confirming that those harmful consequences followed.69
Carving out paid speech as an area for liability is another approach
that runs into the same problems. Paid speech is still speech and platforms
are no more able to determine the legality of this speech without error than
unpaid speech. The SAFE TECH Act would do just this, among other
things. Wyden points out that “creating liability for all commercial
relationships would cause web hosts, cloud storage providers and even
paid email services to purge their networks of any controversial speech.”70
Finally, carving out moderation practices or algorithms as an area for
liability causes a similar exponential growth of possible litigation and
unreasonable cost. One could sue saying the kind of moderation used was
not sufficient and missed certain content, or one could sue and say that the
moderation was overzealous and not allowed by law. Likewise, banning
algorithms for those who want to keep § 230 protections (or many kinds
of them) would create a smaller moderator’s dilemma for platforms
where, if a company uses algorithms to make its platform useful, it risks
liability, but if it no longer uses them, the platform becomes less useful.
These brief examples are far from exhaustive and do not begin to
approach the First Amendment concerns that intersect with each example.
CONCLUSION
When regulating social media, lawmakers must address real concerns
around First Amendment rights, liability, and the broad impact of new
policy. The possible consequences are well documented and cannot be
brushed aside. This Essay does not posit that social media regulation
cannot change, but that policymakers must grapple with First Amendment
concerns, assess the limits of the government’s own information,
acknowledge the limited ability of platforms to reliably find illegal content
or determine a piece of content’s legality, and understand that reforms to
§ 230 often amount to a repeal. Informed proposals should be ready to
tackle these problems and weigh them honestly against the positive
outcomes.
[https://perma.cc/5SSE-KU3Y].
69. Mike Masnick, As Everyone Rushes to Change § 230, New GAO Report Points Out
that FOSTA Hasn’t Lived Up to Any of Its Promises, TECHDIRT (June 23, 2021, 10:49 AM),
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20210622/23305347042/as-everyone-rushes-to-changesection-230-new-gao-report-points-out-that-fosta-hasnt-lived-up-to-any-promises.shtml
[https://perma.cc/5CFP-V74M].
70. Taylor Hatmaker, The SAFE TECH Act Offers § 230 Reform, but the Law’s
Defenders Warn of Major Side Effects, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 5, 2021, 5:15 PM),
https://techcrunch.com/2021/02/05/safe-tech-act-section-230-warner [https://perma.cc/462Y252Q].
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